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ANTITRUST OPTIONS TO REDRESS
ANTICOMPETITIVE RESTRAINTS AND
MONOPOLISTIC PRACTICES BY
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
Stephen F. Ross

t

INTRODUCTION

The hallmark of an antitrust violation is an agreement which
has the effect of raising price, lowering output, or rendering output

unresponsive to consumer demand.'

Owners of clubs comprising

Major League Baseball ("MLB"), the National Football League
("NFL"), the National Basketball Association ("NBA"), and the National Hockey League ("NL") engage in a variety of exploitive activities that consumers cannot avoid by substituting rival products.2
The purpose of this Article is to analyze specific areas where these
monopoly sports leagues harm a variety of groups, through the maintenance of a monopolistic structure that precludes competitive entry,
or through specific restraints that have demonstrable anticompetitive
effects. The analysis is designed to provide potential private and
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois. B.A., J.D., University of California (Berkeley). Thanks to Bert Foer, John Kwoka, and Stefan Szymanski for comments on an earlier draft.
This Article was commissioned by the American Antitrust Institute for consideration of a task
force on sports fan advocacy. It solely reflects my own views.
1 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) ("A restraint
that has the effect of reducing the importance of consumer preference in setting price and output
is not consistent with this fundamental goal of anti-trust law.").
2 Of course, as with any product that is not one of life's necessities, demand will increase
with quality and decrease with price. The lack of support for the cellar-dwelling Baltimore
Orioles does not mean that watching situation comedies, reading a good book, going to a movie,
or spending a quiet evening with a loved one becomes part of the same product narket as Major
League Baseball, even if many Oriole fans may see these activities as preferable this season. Cf
United States v. Corn Products, 234 F. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1916) (L. Hand, J.) (stating that this
sort of monopoly "is therefore only a limited one, but within [these limits] it may be a true
one"). Indeed, the very exploitation that is detailed in Part I, infra, provides strong evidence of
market power, in the absence of such power, consumers would be expected to find a reasonable
substitute rather than pay exorbitant tax subsidies to prevent or attract a franchise relocation, etc.
See also United States v. E.L duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956) ("In considering what is the relevant market for determining the control of price and competition, no more
definite rule can be declared than that commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers
for the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of which
may be illegal.").
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governmental plaintiffs with theories of antitrust liability to support
litigation to vindicate the interests of sports fans, as well as to provide
the policy justification for appropriate legislative intervention.
To be sure, American sports fans are treated to a very high level
of entertainment by the four leading sports leagues, and reap a tremendous amount of enjoyment from professional sports. Sports
leagues, through agreement among owners, have developed a variety
of efficient ways to deliver a more improved product to their fans.
Because the goal of this Article is to provide a roadmap for those interested in stronger enforcement of the antitrust laws, it will not focus
on these desirable aspects of league cooperation. As Judge Richard
Posner has written, just because firms lawfully cooperate in some
procompetitive fashion, it does not follow that "there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no
economies but simply limit competition." 3 This Article focuses on
restraints in the latter category.
I. OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER HARM
Sports leagues present special challenges for those interested in
a sound, consumer-oriented approach to antitrust enforcement. As the
Supreme Court has recognized, sports leagues operate in an industry
where some agreements among competitors-perhaps 4even all the
competitors-is necessary for there to be a product at all. In addition
to the need for joint action to produce a product, sports leagues have
perhaps a unique interest in maintaining a significant degree of competitive balance among the teams within their venture. In conventional markets, both society and individual consumers prefer that
firms strive independently (or in rival joint ventures) to produce the
best possible product, and are willing to reward the most successful
firm with the lion's share of the market; in network markets, consumers are primarily interested in patronizing the seller with the dominant
market share. In contrast, courts seem to accept the economic premise that consumers as a whole are better off, and will show it through
greater patronage of a sports league's product, when a championship
race is characterized by real competition and each fan's team has a
reasonable shot at contention. 5 Finally, as will be discussed in detail
3

Gen. Leaseways Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).

4 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 ("What the NCAA and its member institutions market in

this case is competition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of course, this would
be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and
define the competition to be marketed.").
5 The Supreme Court held in NCAA that promotion of competitive balance was a legitimate goal that could potentially justify significant horizontal restraints on competition. Id. at
117. See also Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) ("[Tlhe NFL has a strong and
unique interest in maintaining competitive balance among its teams."); McNeil v. NFL, 1992-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,982, at 68,771 (D. Minn. 1992) (stating that NFL teams must have "suf-
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in this Article, to the extent that competition policymakers determine
that special circumstances preclude the typical antitrust preference for
fully-competing economic entities-that is to say, economically competing rival leagues-special antitrust review may be required of
league regulations of access and intra-league competition within the
resulting monopoly joint venture.
This Article will focus on three discrete areas where market retribution will be insufficient to check competitive abuses, and where in
fact the hallmarks of an antitrust violation exist. First, leagues have
structured their operations to effectively preclude meaningful new
entry, either by new leagues or by new teams joining the existing joint

venture. The result is an artificial scarcity of franchises, resulting in
lower output as well as higher prices that communities must pay in
order to persuade a league to7 expand or an existing owner to relocate

or remain in the community.

The artificial scarcity harms consumers in a number of ways.
Millions of sports fans in medium-sized cities and occasional major
metropolitan areas are precluded from watching a local sports team at
the major league level, although an unrestrained market might well
ficiently comparable playing strength that football fans will be in enough doubt about the probable outcome of each game and of the various division races that they will be interested in
watching the games"); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club,
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 486 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (upholding labor restraints because of the "need for
competitive balance within the league"). These judicial pronouncements find some support in
the economic literature. Economists Roger Noll and Henry Demmert have independently demonstrated that attendance increases when championship races are closely contested. See HENRY
G. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 11 (1973); Roger Noll, Attendance and PriceSetting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINESS 115, 156-57 (Roger Noll
ed., 1974). Other studies have been less conclusive. See Stefan Szymanski, Income Inequality,
Competitive Balance, and the Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence and a Natural
Experimentfrom English Soccer, 111 ECON. J. 69, 69 (2001) (concluding, with respect to English professional league soccer, that "match attendance appears unrelated to competitive balance'). In any event, competitive balance is only one feature that makes a professional sports
league attractive to fans. For example, minor leagues with high rates of player turnover enjoy
more long-term competitive balance than the major leagues, but have less spectator appeal. See
MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE COMMON LAW OF RESTRAINT OF TRADE: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 226 (1986). Amenities, ease of access to stadia, the availability of substitute
forms of sporting or other entertainment, weather, and income also affect attendance. See Noll,
supra,at 115-20.
6 Cf.United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) (holding that monopolistic control over the only two bridges and one ferry by which trains could cross the Mississippi
River at St. Louis violates the Sherman Act and imposing highly regulatory conduct remedies
and supervision by Interstate Commerce Commission). The Court, however, did not order
divestiture in light of significant economies of scale. See id. at 411 (stressing the need to "preserve to the public a system of great public advantage").
7 This Article does not address the very separate and controversial question of economic
policy whether it is a sound fiscal investment for local governments to invest in the construction
and operation of athletic stadia. Even if the presence of a major league sports club creates many
economic benefits for a local community, these benefits form "consumer surplus" that competition ordinarily should be expected to compete away, for the benefit of local taxpayers. And if a
city's political priorities preclude tax subsidies, league policies that mandate a relocation from
such a city results in a real loss of output.
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support such additional teams. Fans in major metropolitan areas often
forego the convenience of a major league team closer to their home or
office, and big-city fans are also artificially deprived in many cases of
the opportunity for intra-sport competition between multiple teams in
their area, although an unconstrained market would support these
teams. (Chicagoans must suffer with the Bears and only the Bears,
while London hosts six major league soccer teams.) In terms of
wealth transfers, the most significant fact is that the artificial scarcity
allows owners to threaten current cities with relocation, and to insist
on major subsidies to stay (or to be lured away). Through 2006, more
than $7 billion will be spent on new sports facilities, with most of the
money coming from public sources. The average subsidy
from a host
8
city to its sports team will exceed $10 million a year.
Second, unchecked by quality competition, leagues can pursue
profits at the expense of a number of business practices that would
render their product more responsive to consumer demand. Several
leagues display a level of competitive imbalance among teams below
the level that consumers prefer. Alternatives that would improve
competitive balance would include different revenue sharing arrangements among member clubs, but these are rejected by the owners that control the league's policies, because many large-market
owners find it in their individual self-interest to maintain a suboptimal level of competitive imbalance. Other alternatives would
result in less restrictive labor markets. These too are resisted by owners, because the benefits in terms of increased responsiveness to consumer demand is swamped by the loss of monopsony power in the
labor market. 9
Freedom from competition also means that individual club
owners can behave in notoriously inefficient ways, guaranteed a permanent place in a monopoly league and enjoying league policies dictated by a board on which they have an equal vote. In a conventional
"franchise" operation (such as McDonald's or a car dealership, for
example), the nationwide product is governed by an independent
8

See Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs, and Taxes; The Real Connection,

in SPORTS, JOBS, AND TAXES: THE IMPACT OF SPORTS TEAMS AND STADIUMS 494 (Roger G.

Noll & Andrew Zimbalist eds., 1997).
9 For example, although competitive balance improved dramatically in the period immediately following Major League Baseball's reluctant relaxation of severe labor market rules that
precluded any competition for player services, with attendance increasing almost 60%,
nevertheless salaries increased by over 300%. The data is computed in Stephen F. Ross,
Monopoly Sports Leagues, 67 MINN. L. REv. 645, 676 (1989). The rules were changed
pursuant to the order of an arbitrator resolving a grievance filed by the players' union. See
Twelve Clubs Comprising Nat'l League of Prof'l Baseball Clubs v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 101, 118 (1975) (Seitz, Arb.) (sustaining the
grievances of two baseball players whose clubs "had no right or power.., to reserve their services for their exclusive use for any period beyond the 'renewal year' in the contracts which
these players had theretofore signed with their clubs").
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business entity who determines the scope of intra-brand protection,
and invariably retains and exercises the power to revoke franchises
where local operations are inefficiently run. In contrast, the exclusive
geographic territories conferred by most sports leagues appear in
league constitutions requiring super-majority votes to change, and
even the most aggressive and innovative of league Commissioners
would not dare offer more than advice or assistance for (or, at most,
facilitate an attractive buy-out of) grossly inefficient management. 1°
The monopoly structure of leagues also deprives consumers of
realistic options when, as is frequent in some sports, labor strife results in disruption of the provision of desired services. Consumer
deprivation caused by labor unrest is normally not a subject of competition policy, where it results from the exercise of the workers' right
to strike the manufacturer of a product that some consumers happen
to prefer, or where it results from Congress' considered decision to
permit multi-employer, industry-wide bargaining at the option of the
bargaining parties. Often, however, workers do not engage in industry-wide bargaining, and consumers are protected by their ability to
continue to patronize the rivals of those suffering industrial unrest.
One of the benefits of competition policy would be to provide a market structure to provide this consumer protection.
Third, although new technology and an increasingly mobile society have dramatically increased the demand for telecasts of games
from "out-of-market" teams (clubs not based in the area where the
consumer lives), sports leagues have reacted with a series of restrictive agreements that preclude many consumers from viewing desired
games. Exclusive broadcast territories prevent "exiles" from their
hometowns from viewing desired games, or require that fans seeking
to watch their favorite team acquire a blanket license for vastly more
games than they desire to see or for which they desire to pay. Individual exclusive arrangements with certain satellite or cable providers
may also force fans to either forego the ability to watch desired games
or purchase prohibitively expensive and duplicative equipment of rival technologies.
Ordinary sports fans make up the greatest number of victims of
anticompetitive practices by sports leagues. Many fans are precluded
from attending high-caliber professional sporting contests in their local areas because of the artificial scarcity of teams; other fans have no
choice but to endure inferior quality teams caused by local mismanagement; yet others who have moved from the city where they were
raised cannot obtain affordable opportunities to watch their favorite
teams play. But there are many other victims as well. Many taxpay10 Cf. United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 140 (1966) (contrasting the
unilateral decisions of a corporation in dealing with its franchisees with the agreement among
franchisees on how the corporation should deal with other franchises).
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ers who are not sports fans must pay, or forego city services that
would otherwise be funded, because state and local governments provide massive subsidies to retain or attract artificially-scarce franchises. Local governments and local officials similarly cannot efficiently order local priorities because they must face the market power
of monopolistic leagues. Various firms that could be engaged as intermediaries in an unrestricted broadcast market are precluded from
doing so. Finally, although their interests are often protected by the
countervailing power of their unions, players face monopsonistic restraints in the labor market.
One of the purposes of this Article is to provide an analysis for
attorneys representing sports fans or taxpayers (via class actions),
state and local governments, intermediate broadcast providers, and
players, in determining whether to use the antitrust laws" to redress
the competitive harms identified below. Recognizing the legal, economic, and political difficulties with structural remedies, Part 1I of
this Article considers the efficacy of a host of conduct remedies and
then in Part II notes some of the benefits and problems of structural
remedies.
II. APPROPRIATE AREAS OF ANTITRUST INTERVENTION:
CONDUCT REMEDIES

As will be detailed in Part II, many of the harms caused by
monopoly sports leagues may be inevitable results of the exercise of
monopoly power, and the only effective remedies are structural ones
that remove the power of clubs to exploit their economic victims. But
specific conduct remedies are also available under section 1 of the
1 This Article focuses exclusively on federal antitrust laws. There is some precedent for
the proposition that state antitrust laws cannot apply to any league practice that must be uniform
across the country. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 268 (2d Cir. 1971) (rejecting statelaw challenge to league-wide restraints on players because state regulation would require compliance with the strictest antitrust standard imposed among the states in which baseball does
business), af'd, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (stressing uniformity "in any regulation of baseball and its
reserve system" although silent about the application of state antitrust laws to other aspects of
baseball) (emphasis added); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 668 P.2d 674, 678 (Cal.
1983) (en banc) (stating that state antitrust regulation is not applicable to professional football).
These concerns may not be relevant where the courts apply state law in conformity with federal
statutory interpretation. Commerce Clause concerns are only implicated where national uniformity is required and different states might impose different legal standards on an interstate
sports league. Arguably, however, a decision by state courts applying state law consistently
with the Sherman Act would be reviewable by the United States Supreme Court, thus providing
the single authority and national uniformity that obviates any Commerce Clause concerns. See,
e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979) (holding that the Supreme Court has
authority to review Delaware Supreme Court decision applying provision of state constitution,
where Delaware courts interpret state constitutional provision to be substantially similar to
federal constitution, and where Delaware Supreme Court decision was based on federal precedents). Significantly, this pathbreaking opinion in federal-jurisdiction was decided seven years
after Flood.
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Sherman Act. 12 The North American monopoly sports leagues are
not organized as single firms. Rather, each of the leagues is organized akin to a joint venture-the league consists of member clubs,
each of which is individually owned and operated by owners. Moreover, although clubs are sometimes loosely referred to as "franchises," neither George Steinbrenner nor Mario Lemieux should be
confused with the operator of the local McDonald's or 7-11 store.
Club owners do not take their orders from executives at some separate
organization called "Major League Baseball" or the "National
Hockey League"-they are the league, constituting the governing
board and setting league policy.' 3 How league revenues are shared,
who can join the league, who can be an owner, and all other policies
are determined by the owners. Because sports leagues are not independent corporate entities, owners act in their own perceived selfinterest.
This structure can be a blessing or a curse for fans. In some areas, such as expansion, a single corporation running a league could
potentially be beneficial, for a league would be expected to expand as
long as marginal revenue from expansion was positive. Joint ventures, in contrast, will only expand as long as averagerevenue is positive.14 The NBA's well-publicized fight with the Chicago Bulls over
the number of times Michael Jordan could be shown on television1 5
reflected the inability of the venturers to agree on how to share revenue, an inability solved if the league were centrally owned. On the
other hand, intra-league competition among clubs can, in some circumstances, provide benefits to consumers and lessen the monopoly
power of the entire league. Moreover, competition rather than centralized agreement is often a more efficient way to secure the proper
allocation of goods and services.
In at least four specific instances, owners in one or more
leagues have entered into agreements that restrain this intra-league
competition, to the detriment of competition and consumers. Central
to this analysis, of course, is the fact that "market retribution will
[not] be swift" if owners harm consumers-whether through strategic

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2001).
Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350,354 (1967) (corporation formed by competing manufacturers was their instrumentality, not the principal).
'4 This point is elaborated in Stefan Szymanski & Stephen F. Ross, Open Competition
in
League Sports 8 (Sept. 2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Social Science Research
Network) ('[W]hile a single entity league would ordinarily be expected to expand franchises
until... marginal revenue equals zero, the objective of teams in the leagues will be to choose
the number of franchises . . . to maximize average revenue per club."), at
http://papers.ssm.com/pape.tar?abstract-id=243756
15 See Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
12

13
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efforts to increase profits or due to ineptitude-because
of the lack of
16
turn.
can
consumers
whom
to
rivals
market
product
A. NFL Revenue Sharing
All leagues share a significant amount of revenue among member teams. Most of these revenue sharing agreements enhance the
ability of all teams in the league to compete effectively against each
other in athletic competition, and thereby promote the long-term stability and attractiveness of the league itself. 17 Club owners divide
revenues from league-wide television contracts on a per-team basis;
many leagues substantially share revenues from the live gate, from
royalties for the use of team logos, uniforms, etc., and most recently
regarding the revenues derived from the internet. No league, however, requires its members to share revenues resulting from lucrative
stadium deals. This problem is most egregious in the NFL, where
stadium revenues remain the only principal source of unshared revenue.
Potential plaintiffs could challenge the entire system of NFL
rules, arguing that the scheme unreasonably restrains and artificially
channels competition among NFL owners away from an exciting
product on the field and toward exploitation of local taxpayers.
Taken in isolation, many of the league's individual revenue-sharing
rules are probably reasonable. Television and live gate revenues often depend more on the size of the market than on the quality of the
team or its management; sharing these revenues is thus fairer to both
owners and fans of small market teams. Sharing also enhances the
overall quality of the NFL by promoting competitive balance among
clubs, by making it easier for small market teams to periodically contend for the championship (most recently demonstrated by the success
of the Green Bay Packers and the Jacksonville Jaguars). However,
"S See Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Redfield Imports, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982)
(referring to analysis of market power by Posner, J.). For a general discussion of this point, see
supra note 2. A variety of courts have concluded that the sports leagues that are the topic of this
Article are sufficiently different from other forms of entertainment so that the dominant league
exercises market power. The authoritative Supreme Court case on point is Int'l Boxing Co. v.
United States, 358 U.S. 242, 251 (1959), holding that world championship bouts were in a separate market from other major professional boxing. This reasoning supports the lower court
cases as well as a finding of MLB's market power. See, e.g., Fishman v. Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520,
531 (7th Cir. 1986) (relevant product market is live professional basketball); Los Angeles
Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1393 (9th Cir. 1984) (relevant product market is NFL football); USFL v. NFL, 644 F. Supp. 1040, 1056 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (relevant product
market is professional football), aff'd, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); Mid-South Grizzlies v.
NFL, 550 F. Supp. 558, 571, n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (same), aff'd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983);
Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462,501 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (relevant product market is major league hockey).
'7 Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118 (1984); United States
v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (stating that stronger teams do not try to drive
out weaker teams because both teams would fail).
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taken together with the lack of sharing of stadium subsidies, the
NFL's revenue sharing scheme may have, overall, a negative effect
on incentives to efficiency-increasing live gate income, broadcast
ratings, or popularity of team jackets and other paraphernalia-while
maximizing incentives to inefficient conduct: threats to relocate
solely to exploit local taxpayers.1 8
The potential for lucrative, unshared stadium subsidies may
also act as a curb on the willingness of clubs to expand the league.
This has the effect of raising the price localities must pay in terms of
stadium subsidies, reducing the number of franchises in the league,
and locating the franchises in a manner that may well be unresponsive
to consumer preference. 19 Thus, these rules, together, fall within the
Supreme Court's definition of unreasonable trade restraints in the
sports area. 20 Browns/Ravens owner Art Modell would probably not
have moved from Cleveland to Maryland if he personally would
pocket only 1/30 of the subsidy. Less clear, he might not have moved
even if he were able to keep the subsidy but would have to substitute
the revenues from Baltimore's television market for the revenues
from Cleveland's television market. The current situation exists only
because tax subsidies are not shared, while other revenues are.
B. Exclusive BroadcastTerritories
21
The landmark district court decision in United States v. NFL,
established the framework for antitrust analysis of agreements among
member clubs to limit competition among themselves for the broadcasting of their games into other geographic markets. First, the court
found that agreements to limit the freedom of clubs to sell the rights
to the telecasting of their games in markets outside the locality in
which they compete constituted restraints of trade: "When a football
team agrees to restrict the projection of its game in the home areas of
other teams it thereby cuts itself off from this part of its potential
market." 22 Second, though, foreshadowing the same conclusion by
the U.S. Supreme Court over thirty years later in the NCAA case, the
court concluded that the rule of reason was the appropriate mode of

18 Recent financial data demonstrate the extent to which stadium deals, rather than offering a quality on-field product, determines an NFL club's profitability. See Alan Abrahamson &
Sam Farmer, New Stadiums Revealed as Mother's Milk of the NFL, L.A. TwMES, May 13, 2001,
at 1.
19 For example, consider the lack of a franchise in Los Angeles, and the removal of a
franchise from Cleveland despite enormous television ratings there, ratings that did not inure to
the financial benefit of the Cleveland club.
20 See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 108 ("A restraint that has the effect of reducing the importance
of consumer preference in setting price and output" is inconsistent with the purpose of antitrust
law).
21 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
22 id.at 322.
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antitrust analysis, even though the challenged restraints facially appeared to constitute a horizontal market division. This was due to professional sports teams' "unique" interdependence on each other. The
court concluded that "it is both wise and essential that rules be passed
to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger ones
and to keep the League in fairly even balance. ' 3 Third, the court
conducted a fact-sensitive rule of reason, finding that where a fledgling league, with many franchises bordering on viability, depended on
each of its clubs attracting a minimum number of fans to their gate,
the league could reasonably limit simultaneous broadcasts that could
interfere with that essential revenue stream necessary for the continuing viability of the teams. Thus, a "black-out" to protect live gate
sales was upheld.
On the other hand, the court found that the principal purpose
and effect of similar rules to prevent competition solely between rival
television or radio broadcasts was not essential for the viability of the
league, and served primarily to boost the profits (from exclusive
rights sales) of the member clubs. Thus, a division of territories to
protect and enhance the value of the television and radio rights for
each member team was found to be unreasonable.2 4
In the early 1960s, the maverick American Football League
sought to challenge the dominant NFL by developing an innovative
marketing scheme whereby the rights to all their games would be sold
to a single network, who would then choose which games to show in
each local market. The NFL responded in kind, but the trial judge in
United States v. NFL found that the package sale was inconsistent
with the court's order in the prior case; the NFL took its case to Congress, which then passed the Sports Broadcasting Act granting an antitrust exemption for the sale of "all or any part of the rights of such
25
league's member clubs in the sponsored telecasting of the games."
Although the value of this Act remains controversial,26 it is a limited
23 Id. at 323.
24

See id. at 326-27 (finding unreasonable (1) "the restriction on telecasting outside games

in home territories when the home teams are playing away games and telecasting them in their
home territories" and (2) "the restriction of the broadcasting by radio of outside games in home
territories on days when the home teams are playing at home and on days when the home teams
are playing away games and are either televising or broadcasting them in their home territories").
15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2001).
26 As a matter of antitrust analysis, it is surely correct that the package sale of all rights
raises different issues than the horizontal market division condemned in United States. v. NFL.
Once the court rejected any necessity for the horizontal market division because of the unique
needs of a fledgling league, the conclusion was clear that their principal effect was to reduce
output and raise price. A package sale may or may not have the same effect. One can imagine
factual circumstances where a package sale enhances output, because absent the package a
major network will not be willing to broadcast league games. Relatedly, a package sale might
be essential to induce a network to invest in quality-enhancing technology in the production of
the telecast. Alternatively, one can imagine an extremely popular league whose member clubs
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exemption, permitting leagues to restrict competition for sales only
regarding collective sales to a television network. Thus, the NBA's
effort to limit the then-popular Chicago Bulls from broadcasting on a
superstation was found to fall outside the Act's exemption. 27 Moreover, the Act's legislative history makes it clear that the phrase
"sponsored telecasting" was understood to limit the Act's scope to
over-the-air television.28
Notwithstanding the unassailed half-century old holding in
United States. v. NFL and the limited nature of the Sports Broadcasting Act exemption, every major league (other than the NFL, which
continues to sell virtually all its rights pursuant to the Act's exemption) engages in the very restraints on competition that the court held
to be unreasonable. Each league engages in broadcast restraints that
significantly limit the ability of fans to watch games of teams other
than those located in the geographic market where they happen to
reside. Recently, the advent of satellite telecasting has permitted even
greater access to "out-of-market" games. Leagues have indeed responded, each with a product that allows fans, for a significant fee, to
obtain via a satellite receiver a large percentage of the total games
played in the league. But that collective sale is an exclusive license;
fans enjoy no competition for out-of-market games, and must indeed
obtain this entire license regardless of whether they are fanatics interested in watching 1,000 games a year or merely dedicated expatriate
fans of a single team.
Just recently, Major League Baseball extended this scheme to
audio webcasting. As audio technology advanced it was possible during the 2000 baseball season to obtain live play-by-play of the local
radio broadcasts of almost all Major League Baseball teams. Beginning this year, all rights have been exclusively granted to
www.mlb.com, who sells the package for $9.95.
Given the likelihood of demand for a single "blanket license"
for all or a large number of the league's televised games, and the recognized convenience to consumers of such a license, the package sale
of a non-exclusive license would not appear to raise any serious antitrust problems. If consumers were able to contract for out-of-market
would have no difficulty selling broadcast rights to the vast majority of their games through
individual negotiation, so that the effect of the package sale is output reducing.
27 See Chicago Profl Sports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated by 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Tihe Sports Broadcasting Act applies only when the
league has 'transferred' a right to 'sponsored telecasting'. Neither the NBA's contract with NBC
nor its contract with Turner Network Television transfers to the network a right to limit the
broadcasting of other contests.").
28 See Telecasting of Professional Sports Contests: Hearings on H.R. 8757 Before the
Subcomum. on Antitrust (Subcomm. No. 5) of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,87th Cong., 36
(1961) (testimony of NFL Commissioner Pete Rozelle, the principal outside witness supporting
the legislation).
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games on a per-team basis, for example, there would still be a market
for the league's blanket license, but the price would be lower, and
many consumers who are primarily interested in watching the games
of a single out-of-market team would be able to obtain the desired
product at vastly reduced cost.
The exclusive broadcast territories agreed to by MLB, the
NHL, and the NBA are neither necessary to promote competitive balance among member teams nor to prevent any efficiency-deterring
free riding. The only way in which a club's sale of their games into
another geographic market could harm competitive balance would be
if the additional revenue generated from these out-of-market rights
fees would enable the teams to acquire enough talent to enable them
to dominate the league. This scenario is implausible for a number of
reasons. There is no evidence that these fees would be significant
enough to affect competitive balance. More important, there is no
reason why the leagues could not share these revenues, as Major
League Baseball has with teams whose games are carried nationwide
via locally-based superstations.2 9
As to free riding, the claim would have to be made that allowing intra-league competition for broadcast rights would so lessen the
financial incentives or rewards for current teams as to reduce the
quality or output of the overall league product. As the district judge
held in the Bulls litigation, "[m]aximizing revenues and 'protecting
the value' of individual team or NBA contracts are not legitimate jus30
tifications by themselves for restraining trade by limiting output.
The Supreme Court made clear in Fashion Originators Guild of
America v. FederalTrade Commission,3 1 for example, that rivals may
not restrain trade in order to create an economic incentive for improving the quality or innovativeness of their products. 32 Thus, these exclusive territorial schemes seem highly vulnerable to antitrust attack.

29 Cf NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984) (rejecting
NCAA's competitive balance justification in part because of NCAA's ability to promote competitive balance by other means and absence of broadcast restrictions for college basketball).
30 Chicago Prof lSports Ltd. P'ship v. NBA, 754 F. Supp. 1336, 1359 (N.D. Ill.
1991),
aft'd, 961 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1992), vacated by 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
3' 312U.S. 457 (1941).
32 See id. at 467-68. In Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981), the
court held that the common law bar on contracts in restraint of trade did not proscribe a standard
non-competition clause accompanying the sale of a company. Before enforcing the clause,
however, the court carefully considered the reasonableness of the covenant, and expressly rejected the contention that "the payment of money could somehow justify an anti-competitive
covenant." Id. at 266 (quoting plaintiff's argument). Yet this is precisely the implication of an
argument that the payment of money, in the form of higher rights fees, is what makes an outputreducing market division restriction ancillary to some legitimate purpose.
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C. Rules BarringPublic Ownership of Franchises
The interdependence of major league clubs on each other justifies rules requiring league approval of those who seek to possess
ownership rights in the teams. Rules that ensure that teams are not
owned by people who would compromise the integrity and public
attractiveness of the sport, and that facilitate the selection of owners
who are likely to efficiently market and operate their local franchise,
are likely to increase output and make the output more responsive to
consumer demand.
None of these legitimate concerns are implicated, however, in
the rules or practices of each league that prohibit government ownership of franchises (or, in the case of the NFL, prohibit any widespread
participation by the public as shareholders in a team.) Absent these
rules, local governments might obtain equity and shareholder rights in
franchises that are receiving substantial public investments or subsidies. This equity interest would both lower the amount of taxpayer
exploitation (in light of escalating franchise values, the tax subsidy
would be offset by the capital gain accruing to local governments who
received stock in return) as well as inhibit the ability of teams to exploit taxpayers in the future-since significant stock holdings would
be in the possession of those opposed to such a move.
In Sullivan v. NFL,33 the First Circuit suggested that rules that
limit competition in the market for control of franchises can constitute
unlawful trade restraints. That case did not present the issue directly
raised here. On the one hand, the league defended its rule against
clubs publicly offering any of their stock as part of the league's overall policy of ensuring that each member of its joint venture was efficiently running its franchise with the best long-term interests of the
sport at heart. However, the validity of this alleged purpose is severely undermined because the NFL had repeatedly let the plaintiff's
family mismanage (both financially and athletically) the league's only
franchise in New England without taking any steps to replace them.
The league's course of behavior suggested that its ownership rules are
less designed to achieve efficient stewardship of local franchises, and
more designed to protect existing owners (who, after all, established
the rules) from competition-either yardstick competition from more
efficiently-run corporate-owned clubs, or competition within a market
for corporate control for continued stewardship of their team. On the
other hand, the plaintiff in the case was not really seeking to vindicate
the ability of consumers or taxpayers to invest in an NFL team with
its consequent privileges of participation in corporate governance;
rather, he was seeking to recover from financial and operational mis-

" 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994).
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management by raising additional capital from those who would be
minority shareholders with little say in the club.
The court's recognition of the principle that there is a relevant
market for the sale of ownership shares in sports league teams does,
however, provide the basis for a more sophisticated challenge to the
league rules. The rules not only limit the ability of member teams to
sell stock to the public or to governmental units if they so desired (an
output restriction), but also have anticompetitive effects in the product market by precluding an efficient means by which stadia and public infrastructure can be constructed at public expense with compensation via equity. Under NCAA, these effects would appear sufficient to
place the burden on the leagues to demonstrate why their rules are on
balance output-enhancing, a burden the leagues are unlikely to be able
to carry.34
D. The Single-Entity Defense
Leagues hope to preclude the challenges outlined above by
seeking to persuade courts that the member clubs have formed together in a "single entity," like a corporation and its wholly owned
subsidiary, that is legally incapable of conspiring with itself. Such an
argument, if successful, would allow any section 1 claim to be summarily dismissed, but this argument has been rejected by the vast majority of courts to consider the issue, 35 and several of the more favorable opinions appear to confuse the single entity defense with the argument that the challenged conduct was not unreasonable.36 More
3 See generally Lynn Reynolds Hartel, Comment, Community-based Ownership of a
National Football League Franchise: The Ansver to Relocation and Taxpayer Financing of
NFL Teams, 18 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 589, 592 (1998) (proposing community-based public
ownership to purchase NFL teams and prevent them from relocating).
35 See, e.g., Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1388-89 (9th
Cir. 1984) [hereinafter Raiders] (finding NFL teams do not operate as a single entity because
"NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent corporation, but by separate teams acting
jointly"); N. Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1257 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[T]he theory
that a combination of actors can gain exemption from §1 of the Sherman Act by acting as a
'joint venture' has been rejected by the Supreme Court"); Shaw v. Dallas Cowboys Football
Club Ltd., 1998-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) I 72,216, at 82,397 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (requiring people to
buy NFL Sunday Ticket to view games of their choice resulted from agreement among rival
clubs and not from decision of NFL as single entity), affd on other grounds, 172 F.3d 299 (3d
Cir. 1999); Murray v. NFL, 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71, 479, at 77,521 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
("Action taken by the NFL, as a group, to reduce competition ... may constitute concerted
action for the purpose of establishing and antitrust violation."); Chicago Prof'l Sports Ltd.
P'ship v. NBA, 874 F. Supp. 844, 849 (N.D. Ell. 1995), vacated by 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996)
(rejecting single entity defense because professional teams operate independently of the league).
The district court judge in the Rams litigation also rejected the argument, but the Eighth Circuit
did not need to rule on the question to affirm the judgment in favor of the league. See St. Louis
Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. NFL, 154 F.3d 851, 864 n.9 (8th Cir. 1998).
36 See, e.g., NASL v. NFL, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (characterizing the NFL as a single entity because the challenged conduct was a lawful ancillary restraint); San Francisco Seals v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 968-71 (C.D. Cal. 1974)
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recently, leagues have reason to be encouraged by Judge Frank
Easterbrook's decision in Chicago Professional Sports Ltd. v. NBA,
(Bulls 1/)37 remanding a challenge to output restraints adopted by the
NBA for the district court to reconsider the applicability of the single
entity defense. The case was subsequently settled.
Although the league's view might well prevail, it probably will
38
not. Strong arguments can be mustered against the logic of Bulls 11.
If the decision suggests that whenever firms combine to achieve efficiencies, any joint decision should be exempt from rule of reason
scrutiny, this seems inconsistent with the teaching of Judge Easterbrook's mentor, Judge Richard Posner, who wrote that it "does not
follow that because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship there are no competitive gains from forbidding them to cooperate
in ways that yield no economies but simply limit competition. '39 If
the decision suggests that a sports league venture is the economic
equivalent of a single corporation like General Motors and McDonald's,40 this ignores the fundamental difference between corporate
decisions made by a Board of Directors responsible for the welfare of
the entire firm and decisions by those anxious only to maximize their
own profits. Finally, challenges to anticompetitive joint decisions, if
well-pleaded, can demonstrate that the league structure does not constitute a legitimate single entity. Inefficient joint decisions include:
(1) protecting individual owners against intra-league competition; (2)
skewing competition among clubs toward taxpayer exploitation; (3)
locating franchises in order to maximize individual club profits; or (4)
locating franchises because of bargaining difficulties among selfinterested club owners. 4 1 Realistically, in light of the strong arguments against single entity status, it is unlikely that a judge, persuaded
that a league is harming the public, is going find the behavior immune
from antitrust analysis under the single entity doctrine.

(finding no claim of any injury to competition from bar on relocation of franchise to Vancouver).
37 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Bulls ll.
38 I have elsewhere examined this in detail. See Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood
Alliance Between Sports Fans,Players, and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL L. REV. 519, 54955. For a compendium of other articles on this issue, see id. at 549 n.136.
39 Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
40 See Bulls II, 95 F.3d at 598, 600 (discussing sports leagues as analogous to either "a
system of franchises" or a "corporate holding company").
41 See id. at 603 (Cudahy, J., concurring) (stating that "a sports league, no matter what its
ownership structure, can make inefficient decisions only if the individual teams have some
chance of economic gain at the expense of the league").
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E.Analysis of OtherPossible Challenges to Intra-League
Competition
In addition to these three viable section 1 challenges to specific
anticompetitive practices, discussion of three other challenges that
have attracted the attention of courts and commentators is warranted.
As explained below, however, there are significant doctrinal or theoretical difficulties with each of these problems.
1. Restricting Competition in a "Stadium Market"
To date, courts have recognized two scenarios where a league's refusal to permit a franchise to relocate could constitute an unreasonable agreement in restraint of trade. In the Raiders case,42 the court of
appeals upheld a jury verdict based on evidence that the league's refusal to allow the Raiders to relocate from Oakland to Los Angeles
was not based on any harm to the league or its ability to offer "the
most marketable product attainable," but rather "to allow the owners
to extract excess profits. 4 3 In particular, the court focused on evidence that the relocation was motivated by the owners' desire to protect the Los Angeles Rams from intra-metropolitan competition from
the Raiders. In Rams, 44 the court suggested that the league would
violate section 1 if the rest of the clubs had agreed that the Rams
could negotiate a move from Anaheim to St. Louis and that, pending
these negotiations, no other team would seek to relocate to St. Louis.
Such an agreement would bear a strong resemblance to the agreement
to avoid competitive bidding struck down in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.45 Although that case involved a
trade association and not a sports joint venture, there is nothing about
sports leagues' unique needs that requires a league to limit bidding for
a relocation to a single team. However, the court in the Rams case
found no evidence that such an agreement existed, and rejected the
argument that such an agreement could be inferred from the process
42

Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984).

43 Id. at 1392. Specifically, the plaintiffs presented evidence found credible by a jury that

(1) the Los Angeles market could easily support both the Raiders and the Los Angeles Rams;
(2) the NFL had failed to show any harm to the league, in terms of network television exposure,
regional balance, or travel costs, as justification for refusing to permit the relocation; (3) the
NFL rules permitting eight owners to veto the move, combined with evidence that the Rams
strongly objected, supported the conclusion that the leagues' motivation was to protect the Rams
from competition rather than to enhance the quality or marketability of NFL football; and (4) the
league's most persuasive argument -that it had a legitimate interest in recognizing the loyalty
of Oakland fans-was undercut by its lack of any criteria for evaluating relocations and significant evidence that, in other cases, the league was willing to overlook fan loyalty in order to
permit teams to credibly threaten to move unless they received public stadium subsidies.
44 St. Louis Convention & Visitors Comm'n v. NFL, 154 F.3d 851 (8th Cir. 1998).
4' 435 U.S. 679 (1978) (holding that canon of ethics prohibiting members of trade organization from submitting competitive bids violated the Sherman Act).
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that the NFL has established in requiring prior approval for relocation. That process was similar to procedures courts had previously
upheld that required clubs seeking to relocate to obtain prior league
approval based on a variety of factors. 46
In the aforementioned Raiderscase, the court of appeals upheld
a jury verdict in favor of both the Raiders club and the L.A. Coliseum. As to the latter, the jury found that the NFL's refusal to permit
the relocation from Oakland to Los Angeles unreasonably restrained
trade among stadia offering their facilities to NFL teams in the United
States. 47 This has led some to believe that the Raiderscase is not limited to refusals to permit relocation where the league's claimed justifications were unpersuasive and the refusal protected an existing team
from intra-league rivalry.48 The Raiders opinion, however, seems to
require some showing that the refusal to relocate allows the owners
the ability to extract excess profits. Thus, a situation in which a sports
league, having decided to limit the number of franchises, adopts rules
that actually prevent individual owners from extracting excess profits
through bidding among stadium authorities, would seem to fall into
the category of permissible collective action. Attorneys representing
the leagues could then draw appropriate analogies between these policies and maximum price-fixing
4 restraints, now looked upon more benignly by the Supreme Court.
To show an unreasonable restraint in the stadium market, therefore, a plaintiff would have to show that the restraint allowed the
owners excess profits, such as the Raiders I finding that the Rams
were shielded from intra-city competition, or the unproven allegation
in Rams that clubs limited have-not cities' options to bidding for only
one team at a time; or in some other concrete way. Even if league
rules have the effect of reducing the number of relocations, a challenge to a reasonably tailored rule designed to promote fan loyalty
and efficient club management would have to prove that the rules actually barred efficient, procompetitive relocations, and that this was
not outweighed by the benefit from prohibiting inefficient, monopoly4 See, e.g., NBA v. San Diego Clippers Basketball Club, 815 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1987)
(reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Clippers that the NBA rule
requiring league prior approval for franchise relocation was an antitrust violation).
47 See Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum, 726 F.2d at 1393.
48 See, e.g., Robert C. Heintel, Note, The Need for an Alternative to Antitrust Regulation
of the National Football League, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1033, 1062 n.165 (1996) (citing
press reports of congressional testimony from Commissioners Pete Rozelle and Paul Tagliabue).
See generally Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of
Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on IntraleagueRivalry, 32 UCLA L. REV. 219, 286 (1984)
(speculating that when each team is viewed as competing in a stadium market, "the court
opened a conceptual Pandora's box that threatens the league's ability to function at all").
49 See State Oil Co. v. Kban, 522 U.S. 3, 15-16 (1997) (observing legitimate reasons why
defendant, having conferred some economic power on retailer by limiting rivals, would want to
limit a retailer's ability to exploit that power).
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exploiting franchise moves. Leagues can develop anti-relocation
policies that seek to constrain the ability of owners to use leverage to
exploit local taxpayers, such as rules prohibiting relocations where
the current fans are loyal and supportive (in ways, such as television
ratings and live gate sales, other than willingness to provide public
subsidies), and rules that require a showing that the new location's
desirability is based on higher demand of fans, as opposed to a more
lucrative stadium deal.
2. Use of Section I to Regulate Entry into the League
There are considerable conceptual and remedial problems with
any finding that a sports league's refusal to expand to permit a particularfranchise to enter its joint venture constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade. A more plausible challenge relates to the structure
of monopoly sports leagues that permit them to limit access and is
discussed below in Part Ill.
Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL5 ° rejected a claim by the owner of
the Memphis franchise in the defunct World Football League that the
NFL violated the antitrust laws by refusing to admit the club to its
league. The court found that the NFL had not acquired or maintained
its monopoly power unlawfully51 and that the refusal to expand to
Memphis did not contribute to its maintenance of monopoly power.
The court noted that the exclusion was actually procompetitive, by
leaving the Memphis area available as the base for a lucrative franchise in a new league that could compete with the NFL.12 Nor did the
individual NFL owners lessen competition among themselves by refusing to expand, since Memphis was not in a position to provide
meaningful intra-league competition with another club.
One potential, but probably unavailing, line of attack on a sports
league's refusal to expand would be through the essential facilities
doctrine.53 The doctrine holds that rivals who operate a common facility that cannot be duplicated must grant reasonable access to the
facility to excluded competitors. For example, in Hecht v. ProFootball,Inc. ,54 the court found that use of RFK Stadium was essential to permit a rival league franchise to compete with NFL's Washington franchise.
5o 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983).
51 This case came before the determination that the NFL had unlawfully maintained monopoly power through illegal tactics directed at a subsequent rival league. See USFL v. NFL,
842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), discussed infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
52 See Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 786.
53 See Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., An Antitrust Rationalefor the Expansion of Professional
Sports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1692-96 (1996) (citing lower federal court cases where
the courts have adopted the essential facilities doctrine).
A4 570 F.2d 982, 992 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST
131 (1977)).
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There are several problems with successfully persuading a
court to apply this theory to expansion. Factually, it would require a
showing that creation of a new league is not feasible. Especially
given the antitrust preference for competing leagues, courts are going
to be somewhat reluctant to throw in the towel (since any finm seeking to participate in the professional sports market will prefer to join
the incumbent league rather than compete). It would also require a
showing that the sharing is not impractical and will not inhibit the
league's ability to serve its current fans adequately. 55 Granting extremely open access to the current major sports leagues might or
might not be better for fans and local taxpayers (on the margin, the
benefit of a new team to fans in an unserved area almost always exceeds the harm to teams in existing areas from having to spread
player talent over a larger number of teams), but requiring the NFL to
add a team in Memphis seems qualitatively distinct from requiring the
NFL to allow a rival league's team to play in RFK Stadium when the
Redskins are on the road. Moreover, it should be noted that the theory is not universally accepted among commentators and that the Supreme Court has never applied it in a context where the defendant's
provision of access to rivals was not to be supervised by a regulatory
agency.56
Although Supreme Court precedents do not preclude an argument that Mid-South Grizzlies was incorrectly decided, an expansion of existing precedent is unlikely in light of the apparent remedial
problems with mandatory expansion. Even assuming that the Grizzlies could have established that the NFL was violating the antitrust
laws by refusing to expand, why should the expansion necessarily
have been to Memphis? The trial court's opinion in State v. Milwaukee Braves57 is a sufficient negative example to demonstrate why
courts are unlikely to adopt this approach. Presiding over a trial
brought after the Braves relocated to Atlanta, the court acted like a
public utility regulator in determining that baseball could profitably
expand, that Milwaukee could support a baseball team, and that baseball must replace the Braves in Milwaukee (without considering
whether other markets might be more deserving of the limited number
of additional baseball teams that the court found the market would
support).
55 See k at 992-93 ("[The antitrust laws do not require that an essential facility be shared
if such sharing would be impractical or would inhibit the defendant's ability to serve its customers adequately.").
5 Although some believe that Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), was
an essential facilities case, the challenge was not to a generic refusal of a cooperative news
service to expand, but to a specific by-law that permitted a member to exclude local rivals. For
academic criticism of the essential facilities doctrine, see, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusive
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1995 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 110.
71,738 (Wis. Cir. Ct., Milwaukee Co.), rev'd on other
57 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH)
grounds, 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
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3. Labor Market Restraints
For most industries, a consumer-oriented antitrust policy is
either unconcerned or turns a blind eye toward labor restraints. Most
restraints emanate from the agreement among workers to limit competition among themselves; when workers succeed and their efforts
are included in collective bargaining agreements with management
(especially multi-employer agreements with management representing companies who hold a dominant share of relevant output markets), the result may have little effect on consumers, or may have a
significantly adverse affect (if higher wages are passed on in the form
of higher prices). The sports industry is unusual, in that its labor disputes are characterized by efforts by workers to promote competition
and efforts by management to restrain it. More to the point, labor
disputes in sports raise the scenario of management efforts to actually
reduce the quality of their product through an inefficient allocation of
labor, because the benefits that would accrue from a more attractive
product are swamped by the costs of competition in the labor market.
For example, rules that limit the ability of veteran players to obtain
competing bids for their services or to impose a payroll cap on individual teams make it more difficult for inferior teams to quickly improve. The rules not only directly harm fans of these lousy teams,
but-to the extent that next season's heightened competition between
this year's champions and a re-created contender is generally exciting-for fans in general. 58 Although team owners and their defenders
claim that these rules are designed to promote competitive balance
and thus make the season more attractive to fans, these rules would
have that effect only if they restrained teams that would otherwise be
inclined to support high payrolls and were successful in the prior
58 The fans' interest in the efficient allocation of players that a free labor market permits
is
not counter-balanced by an interest in holding down salaries because of a beneficial effect on
ticket prices. High salaries do not cause high ticket prices; it is high ticket prices that permit
owners to pay high salaries. Although the need to generate revenues to support a competitive
team may explain the need for new stadia that permit revenue-generating luxury boxes and
corporate suites, the ticket prices charged for ordinary seats is entirely a function of consumer
demand for those seats. Most games are not sell-outs; owners choose a revenue-maximizing
ticket price based on market demand. If payroll were cut in half tomorrow, there is no reason
why an owner would cut ticket prices; conversely, if payroll were to increase by 50% tomorrow,
owners would not be able to make up the revenue by raising ticket prices-if they could raise
ticket prices without losing revenue, they already would have done so. Cf Donald Turner,
AntitrustPolicy and the Cellophane Case, 70 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1956) (reviewing the antitrust
implications of United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)). Ticket
prices do correlate with salaries in one particular respect, but this is one consistent with the
antitrust policy of having output be responsive to consumer demand. To the extent that a club's
investment in a higher payroll results in a demonstrably improved club, consumer demand for
tickets is likely to increase, which would allow clubs to increase prices. Cf Red Smith, The
Prophet of Doom is Heard Again, N.Y. T]MES, Dec. 14, 1980, §5, at 3 (describing how the
Phillies immediately recouped an $800,000 salary paid to Pete Rose through an equivalent increase in advertising rates and a significant increase in season ticket sales).

2001]

PROFESSIONALSPORTS LEAGUES

year. 59 But these rules equally affect the New York Yankees and the
Baltimore Orioles, the Colorado Avalanche and the New York Rangers, the Philadelphia 76ers and the Chicago Bulls. As a separate matter, management efforts to restrain labor market competition is of particular concern to consumers when-as has happened in the last eight
disputes in Major League Baseball-the labor dispute spills into disruption of a championship season.
Ordinarily, industrial disputes are the domain of labor policy,
not antitrust. Sports are extraordinary, because (a) the monopolistic
structure of the industry deprives fans of any meaningful alternative
when their sport is disrupted and (b) the monopsonistic structure of
the industry's labor market means that antitrust intervention to prevent unreasonable restraints of trade would actually prove effective in
limiting disruptions. Nevertheless, any labor restraint that is incorporated into a collective bargaining agreement with a union is exempt
from antitrust challenge. 60 From sports fans' perspective, this doctrine probably makes sense; whatever benefit fans would get indirectly from a less restrictive labor market pales in comparison to the
benefit of industrial peace and avoidance of work stoppages, benefits
that are facilitated by permitting player unions and management to
reach agreements with the assurance that the agreements will not be
subject to antitrust scrutiny. In addition, however, the Supreme Court
held in Brown v. Pro Football,Inc.,61 that as long as a collective bargaining relationship exists, owners are constrained only by federal
labor law in their ability to impose labor restraints that may have significant anticompetitive effects. The holding was based on the "nonstatutory labor exemption," a judicially-created exemption to the antitrust laws necessary to accommodate both policies concerning collective bargaining contained in federal labor law, as well as the policies
promoting organization of workers into unions reflected in section 6
of the Clayton Act.62
59 In the first case to analyze the unique nature of sports leagues, the court approved rules
"to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the strongerones," not to constrain the clubs
with the highest payrolls. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319,323 (E.D. Pa. 1953) (emphasis added).
60 See, e.g., Wood v. NBA, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987) (exempting provisions governing
a salary cap, the college draft, and the prohibition of player corporations); McCourt v. California
Sports, Inc., 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979) (exempting the N-L's reserve system); Mackey v.
NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976) (exempting the NFL's Rozelle Rule because not the subject
of bona fide good faith bargaining).
6' 518 U.S. 231 (1996).
62 As the Court explained in Connell Const. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Loc. U. No.
100, 421 U.S. 616,621-22 (1975):
The basic sources of organized labor's exemption from federal antitrust laws are §§ 6
and 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731 and 738, 15 U.S.C. § 17 and 29 U.S.C. § 52,
and the Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, 71, and 73, 29 U.S.C. §§ 104, 105, and
113. These statutes declare that labor unions are not combinations or conspiracies in
restraint of trade, and exempt specific union activities, including secondary picketing
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Brown does not completely foreclose an attack on a sports
league labor restraint brought by consumers or a government antitrust
agency on their behalf. The Supreme Court's prior pathmarking plurality decision in Jewel Tea emphasized the need to accommodate
both labor and antitrust policies in formulating the non-statutory labor
exemption. 63 Balancing these interests to preclude a worker who has
chosen to collectively bargain with fellow workers from then invoking the antitrust mandate of free competition when collective bargaining has not proven advantageous is far different from precluding a
consumer with no role in collective bargaining from establishing that
a labor restraint has a direct effect on the quality of output.
Nonetheless, language in this recent decision presents some
formidable obstacles to governmental or consumer plaintiffs. The
majority characterized the issue as whether "application [of the
non-statutory exemption] is necessary to make the statutorily authorized collective-bargaining process work as Congress intended," 64 and then answered the question in the affirmative. Although the decision can be distinguished from a consumer suit by65a
jurist who finds criticism of the Court's holding to be persuasive,
this hurdle will be difficult to surmount.
F. Conclusion as to Conduct Restraints
The foregoing analysis suggests that several anticompetitive
practices engaged in by the major North American sports leagues may
be vulnerable to antitrust challenge by governmental or private plaintiffs. If reforms were required in revenue sharing rules (in the NFL),
broadcast territorial restrictions, and prohibitions on public or governmental stock ownership, fans and taxpayers would see an increase
in output and a decrease in price. Litigation challenging these prac-

and boycotts, from the operation of the antitrust laws. See United States v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1941). They do not exempt concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties. Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965).
The Court has recognized, however, that a proper accommodation between the congressional policy favoring collective bargaining under the NLRA and the congressional
policy favoring free competition in business markets requires that some unionemployer agreements be accorded a limited, non-statutory exemption from antitrust
sanctions. Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
63 See Meat Cutters, 381 US. at 689-90 (White, J.,
plurality opinion). Justice White noted
that the "crucial determinant" was the agreement's "relative impact on the product market and
the interest of union members." Id. at 690 n.5.
64 Brown, 518 U.S. at 237.
65 See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross and Robert B. Lucke, Why Highly PaidAthletes Deserve
More Antitrust Protection titan
Ordinary Factory Workers, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 641, 642-43
(1997) (criticizing the Brown decision as improperly accommodating antitrust and labor policies
in a manner inconsistent with prior precedents).
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tices therefore deserves serious consideration by antitrust enforcers
and the plaintiffs' bar.
Ultimately, however, fans remain subject to significant exploitation by sports leagues because of the absence of reasonable substitute products. Eliminating various forms of restraints on intraleague competition cannot remove the inevitable disincentive for
sports leagues to expand to an optimal number of franchises. As
noted in the prior section, precedents appear to make it very difficult
to challenge league labor market restraints, even when these restraints
reduce competitive balance and present a less attractive product on
the field in order to lower costs and boost profits. The quest for monopsony power in the labor market also enhances the likelihood of
profoundly anti-consumer work stoppages engineered by owners.
Conduct restraints also fail to address the lack of a marketplace correction for owners who inefficiently manage their clubs, or efficiently
choose a profit-maximizing strategy of holding down costs and providing a suboptimal product-such as the Montreal Expos' practice of
spending less on players than it received in revenue sharing, or the
perennial lack of success of the Chicago Cubs, secure in the knowledge that their place in a monopoly league is guaranteed. To address
any of these issues, structural changes need to be considered.

mH. APPROPRIATE AREAS OF ANTITRUST INTERVENTION:
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES

The fundamental cause of consumer exploitation in the sports
industry is the monopoly power possessed by the clubs in each sports
league.66Barriers to entry make new entry a plausible but unrealistic
option.
This part of the Article analyzes structural changes that
would lessen clubs' monopoly power. The Article considers two alternative structural remedies: (1) the reorganization of existing monopoly leagues into competing joint ventures with narrow limits on
permissible inter-league cooperation, or (2) the requirement that the
leagues develop a system permitting reasonable entry of new teams
into their joint venture. As to the latter proposal, the most feasible
and likely means of compliance with such a requirement would be to
adopt the international system of promotion to and relegation from
the major leagues based on on-field performance. As to each alternative, the remedy is briefly described, the economic benefits are con66 See, e.g., Roger G. Noll, Major League Team Sports, in THE STRuCTURE OF AMERICAN
INDUSTRY 378, 379 (W.Adams ed., 5th ed. 1977) (stating that the "possibility of a new league

being organized is not a tight check on the monopolistic position of teams and leagues" because
of problems achieving minimal viable scale, obtaining quality players, and other start-up costs);
Thomas A. Piraino, A Proposalfor the Antitrust Regulation of ProfessionalSports, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 889, 896-98 (1998) (describing the high barriers to entry and stating "the owners of professional sports franchises collectively hold monopoly power within each sport.").
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sidered, and the legal arguments necessary to persuade a court to implement such a remedy are analyzed.
A. Divestiture67
The typical antitrust remedy for monopolization is divestiture.
In theory, a divestiture has the salutary benefits of restoring competition to the relevant market and sparing courts the need to engage in
ongoing judicial supervision of an industry.68 In the sports context, a
divestiture would require at a minimum that there be 2-3 rival leagues
in each sport. These entities.would be permitted (and perhaps, at the
outset, required) to agree with each other on a championship game,
international development of the sport, or other matters where industry-wide cooperation is procompetitive. However, absolutely no inter-league collusion would be tolerated concerning the number and
location of franchises within each league, television contracts, or labor rules.69
1. Economic Benefits of Divestiture
The divestiture remedy would likely be effective in significantly alleviating the consumer harms outlined in Part I of this Article. Leagues would not be able to maintain a sub-optimal number of
franchises-if the National Football League failed to expand into a
67

The following summarizes and updates the analysis detailed in Ross, supra note 9.

68 Remedies in Sherman Act cases should end the unlawful conduct, prevent its recur-

rence, and undo its anticompetitive consequences. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697 (1978) (affirming an injunction prohibiting the professional
society from issuing any policy or guideline that competitive bidding is unethical); United States
v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (stating that divestiture is the most
drastic but most effective remedy); Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947)
(noting the purpose of civil remedies is to "pry open to competition a market that has been
closed by defendants' illegal restraints"). Divestiture is "simple, relatively easy to administer,
and sure." du Pont, 366 U.S. at 330-31. Divestiture has long been used to remedy monopolization violations of section 2. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 391 U.S. 244
(1968); United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944); United States v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 187-88 (1911); Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S.
1, 79 (1911). In Crescent Amusement, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a divestiture
when an exercise of power by a combination violated the Sherman Act and its continued existence created a "tempting opportunity" for further anticompetitive conduct. 323 U.S. at 189. As
the Supreme Court has explained, a divestiture should "(1) put 'an end to the combination or
conspiracy when that is itself the violation'; (2) deprive 'the antitrust defendants of the benefits
of their conspiracy'; and (3) 'break up or render impotent the monopoly power which violates
the Act."' Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 253 (1959) (quoting
Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 128-29 (1948)).
69 A complex and difficult question arises as to whether player unions could choose to
engage in post-divestiture multi-employer bargaining and whether such a choice would be exempted from antitrust scrutiny under the labor exemption. Representatives of the Major League
Baseball Players Association, however, have suggested in the past that it would be extremely
unlikely that they would agree to multi-employer bargaining with competing leagues. In any
event, this Article focuses on the imposition of collusive labor market restraints that do not arise
in the context of multi-employer bargaining permissible under federal labor law.
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viable local market, the American Football League would certainly do
so. Although clubs may be able to capitalize on "brand loyalty" to
obtain some stadium subsidies from the local government in their current location, their ability to use the threat of relocation will be significantly blunted in three related respects. First, most truly viable
open markets will disappear as rival leagues expand. Second, in open
markets realistically capable of supporting only one major league
club, the willingness of taxpayers to provide subsidies to attract a major league term will be significantly diminished as rival leagues compete to become the new entrant in the market.70 Third, the home
crowd will be less willing to provide subsidies to keep their current
team if they know that (a) there is no rival city keen to subsidize a
relocation and (b) if the home team moves, an expansion team from
another league may well be forthcoming.7 '
Although the significant brand loyalty developed by existing
clubs means that entry is not costless and risk-free, the ability of club
owners to engage in business practices that increase profits at the expense of responsiveness to consumer demand would be significantly
inhibited by the ability of rival leagues to add franchises to compete
with established clubs-most likely by directly competing with established clubs in large metropolitan areas (e.g., a new team in Brooklyn
or the San Fernando Valley) or indirectly competing by adding a new
club in the same region (e.g., a team in Columbus if Cincinnati or
Cleveland were faltering), and even in extreme situations by directly
competing in small markets for the eventual natural monopoly in that
local market.72 If one league becomes significantly imbalanced, so
that certain teams do not have a "regularly recurring reasonable hope
of reaching post-season play, ' 73 rival leagues can exploit this imbalance-both by entering new clubs in local markets of the cellardwellers, and by reaping larger television ratings nationwide for their
more-exciting championship seasons. If one league persists in
tolerating inefficient management in a significant market so that its
product is degraded,74 this creates opportunities for rival leagues. Of
70 The saga of the Houston Oilers/Tennessee Titans illustrates this point. The Oilers were

founded in 1959 as part of the maverick American Football League. At the same time, the
incumbent NFL had awarded one of its own franchises to Houston. The market was insufficient
to support two teams, so the Oilers prevailed by offering to spend money to refurbish a local
stadium (the NFL franchise went to Minnesota). Four decades later, with no rival league to
engage in bidding, the same team owner relocated the franchise to Tennessee for nearly $250
million in subsidies. See HousTON POST, Oct. 30, 1959, §5, at 2; Gordon Forbes, Oilers Ready
to Pull Triggeron Move, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 1995, at 4C.
71 For this reason, at least three leagues might be preferable.
72 Cf Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 n.4 (1st
Cir. 1960) (stating that even in natural monopoly markets, the public has an interest in competition, "even though that competition be an elimination bout').
73 The phrasing is from a recent report of outside experts commissioned by Major League
Baseball owners. Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the
Commissioner's Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics 5, at http:llwww.mlb.comlmlb/
downloadslblue_ribbon.pdf (July 2000).
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product is degraded, 74 this creates opportunities for rival leagues. Of
course, constant entry and re-shuffling of major leagues is not the
most likely scenario-rather, the threat of entry is likely to impel existing clubs in a reorganized structure of competing leagues to conform their business practices to consumer demand.
Rival leagues would dramatically increase competition, and
prevent further consumer exploitation, in the broadcasting market.75
Absent inter-league collusion, each league would face considerable
pressure to appeal to out-of-market fans by providing attractive packages of games without regard to territorial exclusivity. Each league
would face considerable competitive pressure to maintain their broadcasts on over-the-air television, a matter of concern in light of the proliferation of games now solely available on a pay-per-view basis in
Europe, 76 and suggestions by astute observers that the future for
American sports lies in that direction.77
Rival leagues would also significantly inhibit consumer victimization through labor stoppages. Player unions would likely find it
in their interest to individually bargain with each league and, if at a
labor impasse, to strike one league while continuing to play for the
other leagues. This tactic would make it more likely for compromises
to be reached; even if season-disrupting strikes were to occur, fans of
struck or locked-out clubs would at least have the benefit of being
able to watch telecasts from other major leagues.
2. Legal Theories to Support a DivestitureRemedy
Although divestiture would provide significant benefits to consumers, and thus would make sound competition policy to be effectuated through specific legislation,78 plaintiffs would probably need to
74 Unlike typical "franchises," because sports leagues are run by the club owners and not a
single independent entity, club owners face no threat of expulsion from the league for mismanagement and even voluntary central-league efforts to remove an owner only occur in the most
egregious cases, such as Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott's erratic personal behavior (including blatantly racist comments) or Philadelphia Eagles owner Leonard Tose's significant
non-sports gambling debts. Only a league run by club owners in their own interests would
tolerate the continuing ineptitude of Los Angeles Clippers' owner Donald Sterling. See, e.g.,
Richard Hoffer, The Loss Generation, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, April 17, 2000, at 58 ("[The Clippers'] helplessness, so practiced and so dependable, is clearly the work of just one man-we're
thinking of Donald Sterling here.").
75 At least for baseball, football, and basketball. Hockey ratings may be too small in the
United States to benefit from inter-league competition, although such competition would clearly
benefit consumers for the other reasons detailed in this part, and, although beyond the scope of
this article, benefit Canadian consumers.
76 See Stefan Szymanski, Sport and Broadcasting 11 (Oct. 2000) (mimeograph, on file
Imperial College Management School).
77 This was one of the major insights made by former baseball commissioner Francis
(Fay) Vincent at a recent symposium on contemporary issues facing baseball at Cardozo Law
School.
78 See Ross, supra note 9.
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prove willful monopolization or conspiracy to monopolize in violation of the Sherman Act to secure a court-ordered divestiture. Governmental or private plaintiffs can muster some strong arguments to
demonstrate monopolization, although substantial obstacles exist to
such a finding.
(a)Major League Baseball
The history of baseball provides strong evidence that Major
League Baseball both unlawfully conspired to restrain trade, and willfully acquired and maintained monopoly power, in violation of the
Sherman Act. As the nineteenth century closed, the National League
was recognized as the sole "major" league of baseball, created as the
first closed league with fixed schedules and contracts. In 1901, they
faced their first serious rival as Ban Johnson transformed the minor
Western League into a major American League and began competing
for players and consumer patronage. Vigorous rivalry was ended in
1903 through a "Peace Agreement" that gave the American League
co-equal status and collusively ended all rivalry between the
leagues. 79 In 1914, an innovative Federal League was created, designed to take advantage of severely exploitive labor restraints agreed
to by National and American League owners and to attract fans
through new stadia (including what is now known as Wrigley Field in
Chicago). The league was crushed, however, first by a series of
predatory tactics, and finally (when federal judge Kenesaw Mountain
Landis simply refused to grant any relief in an antitrust suit filed
against the National and American Leagues) by a settlement. 80 After
World War II, clubs in the Mexican League began to compete in the
labor market, with some speculation that if successful the league
might locate additional clubs in the United States; this competition
was also crushed through an agreement among National and American League owners to blacklist any player who jumped to the rival
league. The last serious potential entrant who sought to compete
with the National and American Leagues was the legendary Branch
Rickey, who developed a Continental League in the late 1950s. His
efforts to compete were shackled by a sudden decision of the established leagues to expand for the first time ever, into four of the eight
markets where Rickey planned to establish clubs, as well as by the
established leagues' maintenance of agreements with minor league

79 See THE BASEBALL ENCYCLOPEDIA 15 (Macmillan, 10th ed. 1996).
so See Lionel S. Sobel, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 4 (1977) ("The so-called
'Peace Agreement' was in reality a death certificate, for it provided that the American and National Leagues were to pay the owners of Federal League teams $600,000 to dissolve it."). For
a complete discussion of the rise and fall of the Federal League, see id. at 1-7.
8' See id. at 7-19.
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clubs that unlawfully foreclosed any new entrant from attracting sufficient players to compete meaningfully.82
Under established antitrust precedents, each of these acts constitutes Sherman Act violations. Even before passage of the strengthened anti-merger provisions of section 7 of the Clayton Act, it was
illegal to agree to merge a market's two firms into a single monopolist.13 Maintaining a monopoly through business practices whose
profitability depends on successfully excluding rivals is the essence of
willful monopolization in violation of section 2. 84 Entering into exclusive agreements that prevent entrants from obtaining inputs (in this
case labor) necessary to compete constitutes an unreasonable restraint
of trade under §1 and monopolization under section 2.85
The major legal obstacle to relief is the Supreme Court's 1972
decision in Flood v. Kuhn,86 which rejected an antitrust challenge to
baseball's traditional reserve clause limiting competition for players'
services. The five-justice majority justified its decision by referring
to baseball's "unique characteristics and needs" and Congress' "positive inaction" in failing to legislatively overturn two previous decisions holding baseball exempt from the Sherman Act. 8 The case for
why the Supreme Court should reconsider this decision in a properly
pleaded case has been detailed elsewhere 88 and will only be summarized here. In short, Flood was a context-specific case where the majority concluded (1) that the reserve clause was a special characteristic essential to the continuation of our National Pastime, (2) that the
antitrust laws as they were interpreted as of the early 1970s would
have condemned this essential labor restraint as per se illegal, and (3)
that Congress shared the justices' views on these matters. In light of
recent standards the Court has established for reconsidering statutory
interpretation precedents that experience has shown to be inconsistent
82
83

See Ross, supra note 9, at 719-2 1.
See N. Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904) (prohibiting the merger of

the Great Northern and Northern Pacific Railway companies, which had competing and substantially parallel lines from the Great Lakes and the Mississippi River to the Pacific ocean at Puget
Sound).
84 The Supreme Court has said that a defendant's conduct is characterized as illegally
predatory when it attempts "to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency." Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985) (citing ROBERT H. BORK,
ANTrrRusT PARADOX 138 (1978)). Absent natural monopoly markets, conduct that is only
profitable if monopoly profits can be recouped is not efficient.
85 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (providing a classic example where Aluminum Co. (ALCOA) formed contracts to deny its rivals the
use of water). In the sports context, the use of contracts to preclude rivals from access to players was expressly enjoined in Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. PhiladelphiaHockey Club,
351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
86 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
87 Id. at 282-84.
88 See Stephen F. Ross, Reconsidering Flood v. Kuhn, 12 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L
REV. 169 (1995).
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with social welfare, 89 plaintiffs could establish that (1) since 1973 it

has become clear that a reserve clause is not essential for the continuation of our National Pastime, (2) in light of the NCAA decision,
the antitrust laws will be interpreted in a flexible manner to permit
any procompetitive agreements that clubs owners need to promote
their product, and (3) Congress has no "positive" view on the continuation of the antitrust exemption. 90
Plaintiffs wishing to pursue a claim against Major League
Baseball would be well advised to carefully craft a complaint that
provides a judge with as many damaging factual allegations against
Major League Baseball as possible, so that judges reviewing a motion
to dismiss the claim under Federal Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a
claim, in light of Flood, will have to accept these facts as given.
Plaintiffs should also rely upon the procedural precedent in Flood
itself, where the district judge, prior to reaffirming baseball's exemption, recognized that the continued vitality of the exemption was factbased and thus a full trial was required. 91
89 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 174 (1989).

90 Several years ago, legislation reported by the House Judiciary Committee concerning
player restraints was accompanied by a report that sharply criticized baseball's exempt status
and emphasized that the failure to propose broader legislation was due to the press of legislative
business and was not an endorsement of judicial precedents. H. R. REP. No. 103-871, at 14-15
(1994). Although this legislation was not acted upon by the Senate, Congress subsequently did
enact the Curt Flood Act of 1998, providing without changing the antitrust laws in any other
way, that agreements among owners relating to major league baseball players are subject to
antitrust scrutiny. 105 Pub. L. No. 297, 112 Stat. 2824 (1998). When the Curt Flood Act was
being considered, sponsors of the legislation also made clear that the legislation had no effect,
one way or the other, on the applicability of a judicial exemption for franchise relocation decisions. See 144 CONG. REc. S 9621-01 (daily ed. July 31, 1998) (remarks of Senators Hatch,
Leahy, and Wellstone). These sponsors' statements are particularly reliable indicators of congressional intent. Not only do these statements match the best reading of the text of the statute
(Section 27 of which provides that "[N]o court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a
basis for changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct ... other than [labor
restraints]"), but the statements took place in the context of Senate consideration of the legislation under unanimous consent procedures. Senator Wellstone was concerned about pending
litigation brought by the Minnesota Attorney General against baseball. See Minn. Twins P'ship
v. Minn., 592 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1013 (1999) (finding that the
Minnesota Twins' attempts to relocate the team was exempt from state and federal antitrust
laws). Had he not received assurances that the ordinary meaning of the text did not prejudice
this case, his objection to further proceeding would have killed the legislation.
91 See Flood v. Kuhn, 312 F. Supp. 404, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ("To obtain a clear view,
the proper judicial course requires ...full consideration of all the facts best adduced at trial.").
In addition to the perceived need to protect an essential characteristic of baseball necessary for the sport's continued existence, Flood also expressed a concern that courts are illequipped to apply antitrust laws to baseball, because overturning baseball's exemption may
arguably subject owners unfairly to treble damage liability for conduct they assumed to be lawful, and that the more open procedures giving all interested parties the ability to participate, such
as those provided through congressional hearings, provides a superior means of determining the
public interest in baseball regulation. Flood,407 U.S. at 279 (citing Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S.
445, 450-52 (1957)). It is not clear whether these concerns are independent of, or simply supplementary to, the Court's primary concerns with protecting baseball's unique and essential
characteristics from the rigid review of contemporary antitrust doctrine. For example, the Court
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(b) National Football League
Although the NFL is subject to the antitrust laws,92 securing a
divestiture order raises its own special problems. The NFL initially
established itself as the single major football league, and then fended
off a challenge after World War II by the rival All-American Football
Conference ("AAFC"). Many believe that the AAFC caused its own
demise by permitting the Cleveland Browns to dominate the league.
The NFL faced a more serious rival with the entry of the American
Football League in 1960, and returned to monopoly power in 1966
following a merger with the rival league. Such a merger, of course,
would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, except that Congress expressly exempted the merger from the antitrust laws by adding an
amendment to pending tax legislation permitting mergers of any two
football leagues organized as "business leagues" under the relevant
provision of the Internal Revenue Code, where the effect (because of
promised
expansion) would be to increase the number of teams in the
93
sport.

Two subsequent rivals, the World and United States Football
Leagues, also proved unsuccessful. In USFL v. NFL,94 the court affirmed a jury's conclusion that the NFL had maintained its power
through unlawful tactics aimed at its upstart rival. Although injunctive relief in that case was denied because the jury was also persuaded
that the upstart league had committed so many economic blunders
that its damages were only one dollar, the Second Circuit also concluded that "Congress has authorized the NFL's single-league structure., 95 This dicta was based on a facial reading of the text of the
statute, which provides an exemption for the merger between any two
football leagues who are organized consistent with certain provisions
of the Internal Revenue Code. Although a judge could order the NFL
had little difficulty in acting to overturn its exemption for insurance in United States v. SouthEastern UnderwritersAss'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), despite even more severe retroactivity problems raised by the government's decision to proceed via criminal indictment. If these concerns
were overriding, however, pursuing a divestiture order from the Federal Trade Commission
would be a viable option. A finding that baseball's owners have engaged in unfair methods of
competition in violation of section 5 of the FIC Act would not subject them to treble damage
liability, and the FTC has the flexibility in the pre-complaint stage to use hearings and a wide
variety of procedures to accommodate all parties.
92 See Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1957) (deciding not to exempt the NFL
from antitrust laws because the Court did not intend to extend exemptions broadly and because
"the volume of interstate business involved in organized professional football places it within
the provisions of the Act").
93 See Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 6(b)(1), 80 Stat. 1515 (1966) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §1291)
("[Antitrust] laws shall not apply to a joint agreement by which the member clubs of two or
more professional football leagues, which . . . combine their operations in expanded single
league so exempt from income tax, if such agreement increases rather than decreases the number of professional football clubs so operating.").
94 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
95 Id. at 1379.
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to re-organize itself in a manner so that it could not take advantage of
this special provision, this special congressional statute might be considered fatal to a claim of divestiture, no matter how outrageous the
NFL's conduct in maintaining a monopoly.
(c) NationalBasketball Association and NationalHockey League

These two leagues are discussed together because the analysis applicable to both leagues are similar-their liability is based
on the willful maintenance of monopoly power through exclusionary conduct in fending off the rival American Basketball Association ("ABA") and World Hockey Association ("WHA") by engaging in a bidding war for players predicated on the maintenance of
monopoly power. Although this conduct occurred several decades
96
ago, there is no statute of limitations on suits for injunctive relief.
Plaintiffs pursuing this theory would demonstrate that the established leagues matched salary offers made by a new league, for
whom a few top stars were more valuable because of their ability
to demonstrate the new league's viability, even though the salaries
were not anticipated to permit profitable operations. 97 An established firm expecting to compete over the long term would not
normally try to match a rival determined to pay unremunerative
salaries. Eventually, the rival would either go out of business, or,
once their credibility had been established in the market, cease
bidding sums that couldn't be recouped. As two economists examining the issue for the U.S. Senate at the time of a proposed merger
of the NBA and its ABA rival explained:
By offering to pay higher salaries, the NBA could force the
ABA to assume a payroll that precluded a chance for profit,
or could relegate the league to minor league status. Some
players might even be offered more than their expected contribution to team revenues-just as in the days of predatory
price cutting some goods were sold at prices below costsince high salaries would lead to higher future profits98if they
contributed to the financial demise of the competition.
96 Cf United States v. E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (action filed
in 1949 challenging stock interest in General Motors Corporation acquired in 1917-1919).
97 In economic terms, the argument is that, in order to establish legitimacy as a major
league, the marginal revenue product of top players was higher for ABA and WHA teams than
for their established NBA and NHL counterparts. If the evidence does indeed establish that
NBA and NHL clubs were losing money, this would suggest that they were paying salaries in
excess of marginal revenue product, which is the buyer-side of equivalent of P<MC, the hallmark of predation. I thank Steven Salop for helpful comments in this regard.
98 ProfessionalBasketball: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of
the Senate Conun. on the Judiciaryon S. 2373, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 368 (1972) (testimony of
Roger Noll and Benjamin Okner).
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Because the NBA and NHL conduct seems premised on their expectation of an ability to recoup monopoly profits later, a practice of paying salaries that bore no relationship to revenues arguably constitutes
monopolization. 99 The systematic and predatory spending by a monopoly joint venture, described above, is distinguishable from the
garden variety hiring of talent that may create monopoly power in a
particular localized market. In the latter case, concerns about how
truly "unique" talented employees are, and the desire to allow an individual to work where they please, may well trump antitrust concerns.'00 Rather, this case more closely resembles the exclusionary
practice of raising rivals costs-the strategy of sacrificing short-term
profits (in this case through higher payrolls) in order to impose higher
costs on rivals, so that the rivals' ability to effectively compete is significantly impaired.'0 '
A city or consumer group, using the initial experience with the
AFL as an example, could argue today that, had the NBA and NHL
not engaged in strategic and exclusionary spending, the rival league
would have survived and would be in competition for stadium rentals
and franchise relocation. Because the plaintiff suffered injury resulting from the league's willful maintenance of monopoly power, relief
under section 2 is a plausible strategy.
3. ConclusionAs to Divestitures
The creation through divestiture of rival leagues would prevent
monopolist club owners from engaging in many of the business practices that exploit consumers and taxpayers. The price of maintaining
a local club (through stadium subsidies) would go down, the number
of franchises would increase, the quality of competition would not be
diminished by efforts to monopsonize the labor market, and the number of games telecast via over-the-air television would increase.
Strong legal arguments can be made that each monopoly league has
engaged in willful monopolization in violation of the Sherman Act,
99 At the time the WHA sought to enter the market, the NHL was also engaged in illegal
monopolization through the structure of its contracts with players. However, their enforcement
of these contracts was preliminarily enjoined. See Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, 351 F. Supp. 462 (E.D. Pa. 1972). The WHA was able to obtain many
talented players. Eventually, the WHA went out of business, like the ABA.
'0 Cf. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW § 702b, at 142
(1996) ("[Talent] should flow to occupations in which it can be used most profitably, and we
greatly value the individual's freedom to enjoy whatever employment opportunities the market
offers.").
101 See Thomas Krattenmaker & Steven Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals'
Cost to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986) (analyzing how "firms can
attain monopoly by making arrangements with suppliers [in the sports context, this would be
players] that place their competitors at a cost disadvantage [in some cases] sufficient to allow
the defendant firm to exercise monopoly power").
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warranting the judicial relief of divestiture. However, there are substantial obstacles, especially in the case of Major League Baseball
with precedents recognizing a judicially-created antitrust exemption,
and the National Football League, with its special merger-authorizing
statute. Thus, antitrust enforcers and consumer advocates may want
to consider legislative advocacy to achieve divestiture as another viable approach to protecting consumers.
In addition to these legal obstacles, there also remains an obstacle of conceptual inertia-the reluctance of judges and policymakers
to enact a structural reform for which there is no clear precedent. As
has been detailed elsewhere, 10 2 the historical fact that competing
leagues have never existed for any extended period of time can be
best explained by the success of dominant leagues in the use of predatory tactics. Thus, to suggest that competition can't work in sports is
arguably like suggesting that, had the Justice Department never broken up Standard Oil, that competition was unworkable in the oil industry simply because John D. Rockefeller and his successors were
able to crush all new entrants. Nor is the unarguable public quest for
a single "champion" at the end of the season sufficient ground to reject rival leagues, for a well-crafted divestiture order can easily accommodate this concern by permitting inter-league cooperation on a
World Series, Super Bowl, or playoff to determine the year's possessor of the Stanley Cup. 10 3 However, recognizing the potential legal
and political difficulties with a divestiture, another important structural reform is considered below.
B. Open Competition in League Sports °4
North American sports leagues are closed: membership of the
league is controlled by existing members, who typically only grant
the right of entry in exchange for a substantial fee. This structure is
not inevitable; indeed, it is not common in most of the world. Elsewhere, sports leagues are typically open: membership of the league is
contingent on success, and every year the worst performing teams are
relegated to the next lowest division and replaced by the best performing teams from that division. Another form of structural relief
likely to reduce monopolistic exploitation and increase consumer welfare would be to require a system of promotion and relegation in
North American sports leagues.
102 See Ross, supranote 9, at 717-33.
103 Allowing all major league clubs in a post-divestiture regime of rival leagues to still

compete for a national championship should be adequate to resolve concerns that network externalities inevitably make larger sports leagues more attractive. Cf. Piraino, supra note 53, at
1692-96 (discussing the essential facilities doctrine).
104 This portion of the Article sketches the argument in favor of this structural reform
detailed in Szymanski & Ross, supranote 14.
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1. Descriptionof the Legal Remedy
Procedurally, the incumbent leagues should be given the initial opportunity to present a plan that maximizes their legitimate efficient goals while complying with a requirement that grants new entrants reasonable access to the major leagues. Such access must allow
a new entrant who makes skillful business and sport-related decisions
to be in a position to viably compete in the top-tier league within two
years. 10 5 Although an antitrust tribunal should not (absent an unwillingness of the defendant leagues to cooperate) mandate the form that
reasonable access should take, it is likely that sports leagues would
select a model roughly maintaining the existing major league as the
top-tier league and adding one or two junior leagues, the lowest tier
featuring easy entry. The creation of a junior league without significant obstacles to entry, combined with the ability to gain promotion to
higher-tier leagues based on success, is the most efficient way to determine the clubs that should constitute the top-tier in the sport. In
order to meet the standard of meaningful entry within two years, reasonably open entry
10 6 must be available no lower than a "third division"
within the sport.
Although continuing supervision of the operation of a promotion and relegation system will be minimal, antitrust tribunals will
need to ensure that incumbent clubs are not able to maintain economic power through unduly restrictive criteria for club ownership or
stadium size. In addition, standard application of the antitrust proscriptions on foreclosing agreements are necessary to ensure that new
clubs can obtain necessary personnel and have access to markets in
order to make their entry timely, likely, and effective.
2. Economic Effects of Open Competition
Open competition would significantly inhibit the ability of
club owners to exploit fans and taxpayers through threats of relocation. The ability to enter would also benefit millions of fans in markets now not served by major league clubs, or under-served by limits
on the number of teams in the league. It would increase the quality of
competition for sports fans in several respects. First, it would in1o5

The time period is borrowed from the government's definition of open entry in its Hori-

zontal Merger Guidelines. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 3.2 (1992) (rev. ed. 1997).
106 The specific definition of open entry will need to be specified for each sport. In general, it should be designed to attract sufficient viable entry to create the realistic potential of
preventing the monopolistic practices of the established teams. In baseball, for example, a club
that sought entry into the open division by a fixed date in the fall (to allow sufficient time for
scheduling the season) might be admitted on a showing that they have secured a stadium with a
minimum seating capacity of 15,000 and have the financial resources to ensure operations,
including a player payroll of $10 million per year, for at least three years.
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crease the incentive for current major league clubs to invest in quality
player talent, in order to avoid relegation. Second, it would provide a
new aspect of each competitive season, as fans not only follow close
races among the league leaders but races among the lesser teams in
the league to avoid relegation. Third, it would provide fans with an
entirely new level of competition, clearly superior to minor league
sport as played in North America today-a competition inferior to
major league play, but where clubs vie for promotion to the major
leagues, which itself will create tremendous fan interest.
Although this structure will not provide all the economic benefits
of divestiture, it can facilitate the erosion of monopoly power in other
areas as well. The ability to enter markets now protected by exclusive
territorial agreements can erode the significant monopoly power that
clubs enjoy-especially clubs in major metropolitan markets. Although brand loyalty will allow the New York Yankees to reap significant profits, for example, they will be inhibited from shifting telecasts to premium cable or pay-per-view if new clubs are begun in
Brooklyn, New Jersey, and Connecticut, especially if any of these
new clubs are promoted to the major leagues.
3. Legal Theory
The best argument to secure a remedial order requiring an openleague structure for North American sports leagues is to establish that
the current agreement among club owners to operate their leagues
with a closed structure is in itself an agreement that unreasonably restrains trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The
agreement to operate as a closed league forecloses competition in two
important respects. First, existing clubs have agreed to exclude potential rivals for stadium subsidies and other benefits now obtained
through relocation. Second, because in an open-league structure all
teams would compete each year against each other to remain in the
major league, the decision to operate as a closed league constitutes an
agreement to foreclose competition among existing clubs.
Admittedly, because this precise challenge has never been
considered in the United States, there are no American precedents
directly on point. Obviously, an agreement among firms that have
never competed against each other in a relevant market not to do so in
the future is as much a horizontal agreement in restraint of trade as an
agreement by current rivals to cease competition. 1 7 Moreover, the
Australian courts have found that their statutory prohibition against
anticompetitive agreements among competitors was violated by
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See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (holding that agreement between

competing providers of bar review courses violated the Sherman Act).
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agreements 0to
8 restrain competition among clubs to remain in a toptier league.
Although plaintiffs can establish that the agreement to maintain
a closed league structure is an agreement dmong rivals to eliminate
competition among themselves and with potential rivals, this is only
the beginning of the inquiry. NCAA recognizes that the nature of
sports leagues requires a more careful analysis of the restraints, so
some form of a rule of reason analysis is required here. The test is
whether output is lower, prices are higher, and demand less respon09
sive to consumer preferences than would otherwise be the case.'
The econonic analysis set forth above demonstrates that the
operation of a closed-league structure does indeed have these anticompetitive effects. In an open league structure, the output for each
sport would increase in quality and quantity, as many new franchises
would form with the hope of potential promotion to the major
leagues. The price that consumers and taxpayers pay in the form of
tax subsidies will decline, for these subsidies will not be necessary to
attract or retain sports franchises when a reasonable substitute can be
built from scratch. In major metropolitan markets, ticket prices may
even be constrained by the alternative of attendance at a junior league
game; in any event, consumer choice is widened by giving fans the
option of paying less money to attend such a game, which is likely to
be of significantly higher quality than a current minor league game.
A few legal obstacles do indeed remain. First, a challenge to
Major League Baseball would need to overcome Flood v. Kuhn.' 0 In
addition to the general arguments discussed above that justify reconsidering that precedent, it can be further distinguished in this particular context. As noted above, one of the key elements in Justice Blackmun's rationale for applying earlier exempting precedents to Curt
Flood's challenge to the reserve clause was Blackmun's perception
that Congress shared his view that the reserve clause was essential to
the National Pastime. In contrast to Flood's challenge to labor market
restraints, a challenge to the closed-league structure of Major League
Baseball is primarily directed to restraints that affect franchise
relocation, and there is no comparable evidence of congressional support for immunizing franchise relocation decisions from antitrust
scrutiny. The principal evidence of congressional endorsement of the
reserve clause relied upon in Flood was the Report of the Subcommit-

log

See News Ltd. v. Australian Rugby League (1996) 139 A.L.R. 193, 338-39 ("[A]t least

some of the clubs which had executed the commitment agreements were in competition or likely
to be in competition with each other to retain their position within the national competition.").
109 See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) ("The
anticompetitive consequences of this arrangement are apparent" because "[p]rice is higher and
output lower than they would otherwise be, and both are unresponsive to consumer preference.").
1o 407 U.S. 258 (1972). See supratext accompanying notes 86-91.
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tee on Study of Monopoly Power of the House Committee on the Ju-

diciary (the "1952 Report").'' That report, in addition to endorsing

"some sort of reserve clause," rejected the idea of completely immunizing baseball from the Sherman Act, expressly citing restrictions on
the relocation of baseball franchises as one area where immunity
would be inappropriate." 2 In addition, after extensive hearings, Congress has refused fervent pleas by the National Football
League to
n3
exempt its relocation decisions from the Sherman Act.
Another preliminary defense that would doubtless be raised is
the claim, discussed above, that leagues constitute a single entity incapable of agreeing to restrain trade under section 1. In addition to
the reasons summarized above for why most courts have rejected this

claim," 4 in this context the argument is not over whether the leagues
as presently constituted are a single entity, but whether the independ-

ent clubs' agreement to form such an entity is unreasonable. A
merger creates a single-entity, but the agreement to merge is subject
to section 1 scrutiny. The agreement to organize the industry with a
closed-league structure likewise is an agreement subject to section
1.115

On the merits of the challenge to the closed-league structure,
the best argument that club owners can offer to respond to the strong
evidence that their agreement raises price, lessens output, and renders
.. H.R. REP. No. 2002, at 229 (1952), cited in Flood,407 U.S. at 272.
12 Id. at 229-30.
113 Many of these legislative proposals are summarized in Charles Gray, Comment, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1329 (1986).
114 See supra text accompanying notes 35-41.
11 Admittedly, the district court opinion in Fraserv. Major League Soccer, 97 F. Supp. 2d
130, 139-42 (D. Mass. 2000) is to the contrary on this point. Having found that MLS was organized differently from the conventional major leagues and was in fact a single entity for purposes of labor restraints, the district judge also rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the decision to
organize MLS as a single entity lessened competition in violation of § I of the Sherman Act and
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Because the decision to organize as a single entity did not reduce
competition in existing markets, the court concluded there was no antitrust violation. This reasoning would appear to conflict with the Supreme Court's decision in Palmerv. BRG of Ga.,
Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990). Nor is the principal precedent relied upon by the district judge really
on point. See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981). In that case, the court
held that Xerox did not violate section 7 by acquiring patents for plain paper copying, because at
the time of the merger the market didn't exist. Absent the merger, the assets necessary to develop photocopying machines would have been held by a single firm, while after the merger the
assets are held by a single firm. In contrast, the claim here and in Fraseris that absent the
agreement, the league would have organized in a manner that would permit more competition.
This single incorrect decision, currently on appeal, should not pose an insurmountable obstacle
to the open competition claim discussed in text, especially since the opinion itself suggests that
conventionally organized leagues are not single entities. See Fraser,97 F. Supp. 2d at 137
(distinguishing benefits and drawbacks of ownership in Major League Soccer from that of ownership in "plural entity" leagues); id. at 142 (analyzing choice to operate different from previous
sports leagues). In relying heavily on the organization of the league as a limited liability
corporation under Delaware law, Fraser impliedly relies on the notion that controlling
shareholders have a fiduciary duty to act on behalf of the entire corporation. Id. at 134-35, 137
n.9. In contrast, conventional league owners act in their own clubs' self-interest.
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output unresponsive to consumer demand, is to argue that requiring
an open-league structure is tantamount to compulsory access to their
joint venture, and such access is often disfavored because of concerns
that new entrants will free ride on the prior investment of the existing
members of the venture, with consequent adverse effects on the
incentive of firms to invest in the venture. As the Supreme Court emphasized in NCAA, the focus must remain on the effects of any restraint, or what would occur absent a restraint, on price and output.
Because the institution of open competition will lead to efficient output increases through increased investment, it is difficult to see how a
free rider defense would be valid in this context. Finally, to the extent
that a portion of the prior investment by clubs in the major leagues
can be considered as capital specific to membership in the league, a
reasonable fee might be imposed upon clubs being promoted to the
major league, to be paid out to those clubs being demoted (similar to
capital fees paid by attorneys or accountants upon admission to and
exit from partnership at their firms).
CONCLUSION: WHERE TO

Go FROM HERE

This Article has outlined a variety of ways that current agreements among owners of the major North American sports leagues
appear to violate the antitrust laws. Although the validity of these
claims will be strongly contested, the Article is intended to stimulate
serious consideration of these claims on behalf of private plaintiffs
and governmental entities.
In terms of dollars lost through wealth transfers, local governments are probably the major victims of sports leagues' anticompetitive practices. Challenging NFL rules that facilitate the exploitation
of local governments and bringing actions to secure structural relief
may prove to be sound investments by local governments, especially
if costs could be shared through coordinated litigation. Consumers
are most directly exploited today by anticompetitive broadcast market
restrictions. Challenges to these restraints are perhaps the most feasible for private attorneys who specialize in consumer class action litigation. Local businesses that would benefit from a new major league
franchise in their city might also be willing to finance litigation seeking injunctive relief that would facilitate new entry. Finally, the benefits to the public interest and to the political career of a state attorney
general who manages to secure a franchise for her state -either
through the forces of competition following structural or conduct relief, or via settlement after presenting a viable claim sketched herecannot be underestimated.
Of course, any remedy that could be lawfully imposed by a federal judge as relief for a proven antitrust violation may be legislatively imposed by Congress. In particular, we believe that our pro-
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posal for open competition-the system of promotion and relegation
to the major leagues-deserves serious legislative consideration. Although it would face opposition from monopoly sports league owners
and some risk-averse fans fearful that their team might be relegated,
the proposal is one that would benefit millions of sports fans across
the country, as well as even greater millions of taxpayers forced to
subsidize games they don't even enjoy. If grass roots support can be
organized, perhaps by consumer advocacy groups, perhaps by local
officials anxious to end their exploitation by club owners, the political
strength may match the merit of the proposal in advancing the public
interest.

